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Conflicts between central and local governments, in particular 
between Westminster and the councils of the large urban areas, have 
been a marked feature of the past decade in Britain. The tensions 
evident enough during the years of Edward Heath, Harold Wilson and 
James Callaghan have become sharper and more divisive since Margaret 
Thatcher and the 1 new right' came to power. Over the past three years 
these central/local confrontations have led the national government to 
take extraordinary measures to control those recalcitrant local auth-
orities which resisted specific programmes or the demands for general 
economic stringencies. 
Some of the most publicised and acrimonious disputes occurred in 
Scotland. Dundee and Stirling District councils mounted campaigns of 
resistance to the Tenants Rights (Scotland) Act of 1980, the Act which 
gave expression to one aspect of the government's determination to 
1privatise' public resources by requiring local authorities to organ-
ise the sale of council houses. Lothian Region, over many months, 
attempted to defy the Secretary of State for Scotland's demands for 
substantial reductions in local government spending and the ruling 
Labour Group seriously considered resigning en bloc in order to avoid 
implementing what it saw as harmful and unnecessary policies handed 
down from London. The level of opposition to the austerities required 
by the Thatcher government has prompted legislation which effectively 
redefines the rights and responsibilities of local authorities. In 
England and Wales the Minister for the Environment, Michael Hesel-
tine, has taken new powers to force local administrations to follow 
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his directives and in Scotland we have had the Local Government 
(Miscellaneous Provisions)(Scotland) Act of 1981 to bolster the al-
ready substantial powers vested in George Younger as Secretary of 
State. In both cases - but most evidently in Scotland - the effect 
has been greatly to reduce the autonomy of local government and 
substantially to increase the coercive powers of the central state. 
It is ironic that the party which campaigned for a 'rolling back of 
the state' and which historically has made much of the virtues of 
local autonomy should so strengthen the powers of Whitehall and 
Westminster. 
Local politics, then, and especially urban politics, have 
been changing in the last few years. The relations between central 
and local levels of government have become more bitter and cont-
estatory, the ideological differences between 'left' and 'right' 
have widened,or at least become more evident,as local politics has 
become more and more incorporated in battles between the major na-
tional parties. And increasingly the anger and resistance on both 
the left and the right has broken out of the formal party struc-
ture and spilled on to the streets in marches and demonstrations. 
So how should we make sense of this? Recent writings in public 
administration and political science on central-local relations 
tend to fall into two categories: -those that rest on the analysis 
of economic relations between levels of government, and those which 
look mainly at what we might call institutional politics - the 
study of political parties, and of political relations between 
centre and locality. 
Precisely because the recent arguments between the Secretary 
of State and the leaders of some local authorities in Scotland have 
been cast in money terms, there has been a good deal of academic 
work focussed on the financial aspects( 2 ). And this work reveals 
some of the real and very disquieting effects of the actions of the 
new right. Thus, in Scotland we can see that the changing distri-
bution of rate support grant, which has benefitted the high tax 
base, low spending authorities at the expense of the low tax base, 
high spending authorities, is weakening the traditional attempts 
at redistribution. It is unashamedly regressive, productive of 
greater inequalities between regions. And it is also plain that 
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central government places low priority on specific services when 
it projects falls of 9.5% and 39% for education and housing be-
tween 1979/80 and 1983/84(
3
). These investigations of the financial 
problems of the local authorities lead invariably to the conclusion 
that we cannot analyse the plight of local government simply in 
terms of 'financial strain' or 'fiscal crisis', that behind the 
economic arguments lie profound differences in political objectives 
and complex political struggles. 
Since the mid-seventies the relations between central and local 
governments have been changing. In Scotland, for instance, the once 
rather cosy relationship between the Scottish Office and local ad-
ministrations has become markedly more acrimonious as central govern-
ment has sought to impose stricter and more direct control over lo-
cal affairs. There has been a real loss of local autonomy and that 
is resented. Moreover, as several writers point out( 4 ), local poli-
tics have been articulated more and more through national parties. 
Simply put they have been 'nationalised'·• Local issues are not only 
given expression through national parties, but the nature of local 
political discourse becomes more and more intimately connected with, 
and responsive to,national concerns. The effect is to link paro-
chial aspirations or discontents to wider, more general themes and 
thereby frequently to sharpen and strengthen opposition to central 
government. 
The two strands of writing, then, the one dealing basically 
with the economic position of local authorities, the other treating 
the political relationships, illuminate some aspects of the present 
struggles but they still leave us with many unanswered questions. 
In particular, they offer little to explain why it was that the most 
vigorous confrontations between central and local government occurred 
where they did. 
It seems to us that if we are to understand this we need an al-
together more sociological approach. That is easy to say, but what 
precisely would it look like? Which factors really help explain why 
resistance developed where it did? Some preliminary work on resis-
tance in Lothian and Dundee suggests that we need to look at three 
things. 
First, we need to focus on the political orientations, commit-
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m<>nts and organisational skill of those in positions of power. That 
means the councillors and the party activists. But it is important 
that we go beyond this, that we develop a conception of the local 
polity which encompasses the multitude of loosely constituted groups 
and associations whose members play important roles in the mobil-
ising of opinion and the shaping of political action. It also means 
retaining a sense of the broad changes that are occurring in the 
modes of representation and the repertoires of collective action 
the increasing reliance on single issue groups, the familiarity with 
methods of lobbying or demonstrating and the appearance of new par-
ties at local as well as national levels. 
Secondly, we require a sharp appreciation of politics as pro-
cess, as a continuous set of struggles, for today's conflicts draw 
upon and are in some measure shaped by the legacies of earlier 
battles. In local politics there are 'legacies' of a material kind 
in the form of particular sorts or levels of public goods and pub-
lic services won in prior struggles. There are legacies in the form 
of organisations and institutions through which opinion has been 
mobilised before; there are legacies of personal and institutional 
contacts, networks that can be drawn upon when the need arises·. 
Finally, there are legacies of ideals, ideas and symbols that play 
an important part in the political discourse in any region or city. 
Thirdly, it is important to recognise that local politics are 
imbedded in a wider political framework, that their relationships 
with central government may be shaped by party political consider-
ations of a national kind. It matters whether a local administra-
tion is made of the same party complexion as the Westminster govern-
ment, or is made up of those from the opposing party; it matters 
that particular local authorities may have earned themselves a re-
putation for intransigence or militancy in the past. And it is ob-
viously important to pay attention to the balance of political forces 
at local levels. Marginal districts or regions may become targets 
for central government action - their expenditures identified as 
'excessive and unreasonable', for example- if there is some pro-
spect that the ensuing political struggle may lead to success for 
the government party in forthcoming local elections. Local struggles 
are conditioned in important ways by such considerations. 
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W<> can now return to the initial question. Why and how did re-
sistance to the government's measures appear in particular local 
authorities? We will focus on Dundee and on Lothian;(S) the first, 
a case of the lower tier of administration (a district) opposing 
the directives to sell off council houses; the second, a higher 
tier (a region) fighting government efforts to cut its overall 
budget by £47 million. The two authorities could hardly be more 
different; Dundee is an industrial city with much urban decay 
and deprivation; the other is a large area dominated by the bour-
geois and relatively prosperous city of Edinburgh. However, in two 
important respects there was a resemblance - both had Labour coun-
cils, and both were marginal. 
Labour on Lothian Region could muster, after one councillor 
defected to the SDP, 25 members out of a council of 48. In Dundee, 
the Labour administration had a more comfortable majority of 6 
over other parties in the 1980 District elections. However, in the 
twelve previous years, Dundee had a succession of 'hung' adminis-
trations, and no party had overall control in that period(
6 l. In 
both Lothian and Dundee, marginality has heightened the level of 
political awareness and controversy. 
A popular explanation for the resistance of Lothian to Mr 
Younger's demands, one found in the press and employed by the Con-
servatives locally, was familiar enough. The confrontation, we werP 
told, was being sought by a dedicated group of marxists and ultra-
leftists on the council. They were - quite illegitimately, it was 
said - challenging the authority of the democratically elected 
national government. What one saw in Lothian region, it was argued, 
was a manifestation of those broad changes which had tilted the 
Labour Party in the country as a whole, decisively to the left. The 
ruling group on the local council was now being dominated by young, 
inexperienced, idealistic, even fanatical leftists. Or so we were 
informed. Much was made of the internal conflicts in the Labour 
group. The young turks supposedly were out of step with the older, 
more cautious,members of their own party and out of touch with the 
mass of Labour voters(
7
). 
In these popular explanations there were powerful echoes of a 
thesis well-known in British political sociology - the decline of 
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working class politics(B). Was there then some truth in thP asser-
tion that the Labour Party was dominated by young middle class act-
ivists who were preventing the party from articulating the inter-
ests of the working class? Some recent work on the social composi-
tion of local Labour parties does indeed suggest that important 
changes have been taking place<
9 l. Was this also true in Edinburgh? 
Over the past year some of our students(lO) have set out to examine 
this matter, and from their work we can examine the political orien-
tations and social characteristics of the Labour councillors and ac-
tivists. 
First, analysis of the ruling Labour group on the council re-
vealed that a good many were young, professionally qualified or in 
other middle class jobs. Seven of the twenty Labour councillors sur-
veyed had professional backgrounds, four had clerical or other non-
manual jobs, six were manual workers, two were businessmen and one 
gave her occupation as housewife. At the risk of some oversimplifica-
tion one could discern a division between an Old Guard of established 
local politicians and a New Wave of Labour representatives. Of the 
eight most recently elected (since 1974), seven had received higher 
education, and of these five had been in social service occupations. 
There was too a rough correspondence between this division and the 
distinct geographical areas from which they came. Most of the New 
Wave represented wards of the city while the Old Guard were rec-















YEARS ON COUNCIL BY AREA REPRESENTED 
Years on Council 
Less than ten years More than ten years 
Landward wards 
City wards 7 
As one commentator(ll) has written: 
The radical councillors who dominated Lothian 
when it fought the government were elected from 
Edinburgh seats - though their majority over the 
Conservatives depended on seats won for Labour in 
mining areas around the city. These councillors 
were young, highly educated and sufficiently dedi-
cated to give up paid employment to be councillors 
full-time. Indeed, at one point, 22 of Labour's 26 
councillors were full-timers. 
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There is little doubt that a number of the newer, professionally 
qualified, full-time councillors were attracted by the prospects of 
creating in Lothian an administration which operated on more 'gen-
uinely socialist' lines. Their much clearer, more ideological commit-
ments provided the zeal for the battles with the central authority. 
From the interviews it is plain too that the more recently elected 
Labour councillors entered local government, not as had happened so 
often in the past, as a stepping stone to Parliament, but as a worth-
while political career in itself. They saw the newly created region 
as a substantial arena within which to attain some of their politi-
cal objectives(
12 l. Their emergence represented too a partial re-
form of the local party since to win the nominations they and their 
supporters ousted a good few of the more pragmatic and,in one or 
two instances, possibly corrupt, old stagers. 
Secondly, it was possible to see that among the younger coun-
cillors there was a new conception of their role. In particular they 
saw it as their task to encourage political activism on the part of 
local or issue-specific groups and to be responsive to pressure groups 
in the form of tenants associations, women's rights groups and others. 
Thus, for them 'politics' involved far more than formal party affairs, 
which was not to say that their responsibilities to the party were 
taken lightly. Far from it. They believed that councillors ~ act 
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more strictly in accordance with a party line than had the Old Guard, 
with their propensity for compromise. Theirs, indeed, was a more 
ideological politics, their view of their role more that of dele-
gates than representatives of all their constituents. 
Behind all this lay an important structural change. The re-
organisation in 1975 created two tiers of government - Lothian Re-
gion and Edinburgh District - each with distinct functions. The Re-
gion with a budget of four times that of the District constituted a 
new, much larger political arena. An authority with much more exten-
sive powers and a larger budget attracted aspiring councillors in 
part from the seasoned activists of the old local governments but 
also, and importantly, from many whose engagement with local politics 
was fairly recent. What the latter, in particular, were working to-
wards was a new style of local political activity. To see these new 
recruits drawn largely from professional (and specifically social 
service backgrounds) as representing a 'decline' in working class 
politics is wrong. What they offered was a broader approach, a quest 
for political expression and mobilisation through additional grass-
roots channels and diverse local associations. 
A second study(l
3
) focussing on Labour Party activists in two 
Parliamentary constituencies in Edinburgh confirmed this impression 
of there being a new wave of political actors( 14 >. Again the evidence 
of a preponderance of 'middle class• activists was clear but closer 
examination showed that most had been upwardly mobile and their iden-
tification with their working class roots and the perception of their 
objectives·as 'working class' politics was very strong. One could not 
draw from this research support for Hindess• statement that 
there has been a decline in political activity resulting 
from identification with,and commitment to,the interests 
of the working class as such(15) 
Rather what both pieces of work show is that the Labour Party at 
grass roots level is becoming more and more a party whose activists 
are young, highly educated and occupationally mobile. What they want 
is a more robust, more principled form of socialism. From their 
ranks came some of the local councillors and their deep suspicion 
of the current Parliamentary leaders (on the Left as well as the 
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Right) did much to inspire their opposition to the Secretary of State. 
It gave them stomach for the fight. 
During those months when the confrontation with the Secretary 
of State was at its height the attempts to mobilise popular opposi-
tion to the proposed cuts in expenditure produced obvious results( 16 l. 
Between February and September 1981 there were strikes and rallies, 
petitions were signed and M.P.s lobbied. Many hundreds of trade union-
ists, local authority workers, council tenants and other~ partici-
pated in what the Lothian Region Joint Trade Union Committee dubbed 
'the battle for Lothian'. On June 30th some 10,000 people marched 
through the city centre and attended a rally to protest against Mr 
Younger's proposal to cut £47 million from the regional rate support 
grant. There clearly ~ much popular support for the Labour Group 
on the Council and for the local Labour Party's strategy of resistance 
- and it was evident that the diverse associations of workers and 
tenants could be induced to act, albeit briefly, in a solidaristic 
way. No doubt the collaboration of so many voluntary bodies owed a 
good deal to the visibility of the opposition, for the Lothian rate-
payers group, R.A.G.E., also sought to mobilise opinion in support 
of the Local Tory councillors andfor what it saw as Mr Younger's 
laudable efforts to produce regional 'economy measures'. 
Throughout these months then it was quite clear that much po-
litical action, both in defiance of,and in support of,the policies 
of the new right was articulated through a complex web of local 
associations. The importance of those informal, that is, extra-
party structures was plain to see. The Labour Group could call on 
the historic ties and natural sympathies of the unions and,through 
a network of personal and institutional links,summon diverse work-
ing class and leftist groups to the fray. Likewise, the Conservatives 
could employ the old slogans of the Progressive Association to rally 
ra~epayers and activists on the right. 
Here we can see the importance of the second factor explaining 
why resistance developed in Lothian the historic legacies of local 
class conflicts. The symbols, slogans and latent groupings were all 
pressed into service. The significance of past legacies in the local 
polity was revealed in ever sharper detail in the conflicts that took 
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place in Dundee(
17 >. Politically and financially, district councils 
are of less account than the regional authorities but in the re-
organised structure they have retained one very important function. 
The districts still control public housing and,in Scotland where 
there is such a huge stock of council property,that resource really 
matters(lS). Moreover, it is tYPically seen as something created by 
the Labour Party, constituting one, if not the major achievement 
of local socialist policy. Dundee has a very long-standing housing 
problem. It was notorious for the poor quality of its housing not 
only in the nineteenth century but, as recent historical work shows, 
even in the 1950s it had a formidable problem and was the city with 
the worst housing conditions in Scotland(l9 ). 
In the post-war period council housing was provided on a very 
large scale in Dundee. Over thirty odd years it came to be a 'pre-
cious legacy' of Labour's efforts. The programme of privatisation 
set in train by the Thatcher government was perceived by many Dun-
donians as something close to sacrilege. Labour Councillors point-
ed out that selling off council houses would only exacerbate a 
still serious housing shortage and since funds for new council house 
building were now minimal the policy would simply reduce the quality 
of housing left in public hands .. Public housing really had become 
part of the social wage for the working class in Dundee. It had great-
er significance in their lives and for the Labour Group it had pro-
found symbolic importance. Around the housing issue then there was 
a rich potential for political mobilisation, for the emergence of 
something that might be seen as an urban social movement. 
British writers have long been sceptical about the possibility 
of urban social movements developing in this country in anything like 
the way they have done in some continental countries< 20 >. In particu-
lar there have been doubts about the feasibility of linking disputes 
about 'consumption' issues (like housing) to the struggles of the 
workplace. And, given the narrow economism of many British unions, 
these misgivings have not been groundless. But in Dundee in 1980-81 
the defiance of central government directives about housing took on 
the character of a class-based movement and did so through the sub-
stantial involvement of union organisations. If we seek to understand 
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this unusual occurrence we are brought to a sharp appreciation of the 
ways local polities are shaped by historical processes. 
Dundee is an industrial city, indeed it is Scotland's ~ in-
dustrial city with an even larger proportion of its working population 
involved in manufacturing than Glasgow has. In 1971 some 43% were so 
employed; in Glasgow only 32% were. Many of its traditional indust-
ries, especially those organised around the jute trade or shipbuild-
ing were in serious decline in the early post-war period and in the 
sixties new concerns were persuaded to establish themselves in the 
city to provide work for its pool of unemployed. Firms specialising 
in mechanical engineering, instrument making and electrical engin-
eering became major employers and as they grew so too did the strength 
of one particular industrial union - the Amalgamated Union of Engin-
eering Workers. It emerged as the dominant union in the dominant 
industries. With 9,500 members it represents 1 in 8 of all insured 
workers in the city. 
Over the past fifteen years this union (and its predecessor, 
the AEU) has come to play a most important role in the political life 
of the city, and throughout the 'No-Sales' campaign in 1980-81 it 
did more than any other agency to mobilise support and shape opposi-
tional strategies. It did so not by using the formal channels of 
Labour Party/Trade Union communication (the Trades Council, for in-
stance) and not by simple lobbying of the local politicians. Rather 
its influence came from two informal groups which had been establish-
ed principally at its initiative and which it effectively dominated. 
The first, the Liaison Committee, was set up in the early nineteen 
seventies to coordinate opposition to the Labour government's pro-
posals for industrial relations reform and subsequently to the Con-
servatives' Industrial Relations Act. It brought together in an un-
official, but highly influential way, local shop stewards of the 
A.U.E.W. The second, the full-time officers' group (the FTO) was 
created in the mid seventies with the purpose of establishing a per-
manent, though informal, communications network for the Labour move-
ment. It invited all full-time union officials and Labour Party 
officials to bi-weekly meetings and due to their numerical importance 
(and the poor attendance of white-collar union representatives) the 
officers of the AUEW have remained the most important members of this 
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group. The liaison committee, which brings together about five hundred 
unionist and Labour Party officials provided, during the 'No-Sales' 
campaign, a most effective means of mobilising popular opposition to 
the government's policy, since the delegates to its meetings relayed 
information about the council housing issue and about the committee's 
deliberations directly to the workers on the shop floor. In this way 
it linked work place and community struggles and there was ample 
evidence of the willingness of AUEW rank and file members to engage 
in the campaign in defence of public housing. The F.T.O. group with 
its fortnightly meetings also played a part in the general mobilisa-
tion but, more importantly it offered a forum within which strategies 
and tactics could be discussed. It was extremely important that the 
programme of resistance be carefully managed. For one thing, it had 
to allow time for the Labour Party to publicise and politicise the 
issue. Too vigorous a reaction might prompt the Secretary of State 
to take special steps to ensure conformity before a broad base of 
popular opposition could be rallied. The evidence suggests that the 
F.T.O. group displayed a good deal of sensitivity and skill in this 
process of orchestrating the popular discontent. 
One other group of trades unionists were also to feature in the 
Dundee campaign. The role of public service workers in contemporary 
urban politics is an extremely delicate and interesting one< 21 l. They 
now constitute a large and relatively highly organised group whose 
livelihoods are directly affected by central government efforts to 
restrain local expenditure. They have the potential to exert consid-
erable influence on the central-local struggles and the politicisa-
tion of these. Some evidence of that was seen in Dundee. The local 
branch of the National Association of Local Government Officers (NALGO) 
reacted to the Tenants'Rights (Scotland) Act by announcing that its 
members would refuse to process any applications for council house 
sales until additional staff were taken on for that purpose. Although 
this technically put them in dispute with the council it also provided 
the Labour Group with an additional reason for resisting the Thatcher 
government's wishes. Moreover, when the NALGO branch secretary roundly 
condemned the sales policy he was effectively aligning his members 
with the Labour Group's stance. And there was one other important 
contribution made by the public service workers. Those of them who 
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were employed directly in the administration of local public housing 
had at their disposal the best sources of information on local housing 
conditions and housing policies. They had the ammunition with which to 
launch a reasoned attack on the privatisation policy. This they did. 
At the public enquiry on 23rd February 1981 the NALGO representative 
produced the most impressive and best researched arguments against the 
sales policy, pointing out the serious economic and social effects 
this would have, demonstrating that local people in a recent survey 
had been much more concerned about housing conditions than forms of 
tenure and revealing the essentially political, as opposed to economic 
or administrative purposes, of the government's plans. 
The public service workers had played an important role. Yet they 
were never fully integrated into the campaign. The industrial unions 
made no efforts to involve them in their efforts at mobilisation or 
their deliberations concerning strategy. And for its part, NALGO pur-
sued a self-consciously independent line. As for the Labour councill-
ors, while they undoubtedly welcomed the support which NALGO provided 
for their stand they were more than a little apprehensive that unless 
they were careful, their opponents would charge them with deliberate 
political manipulation of NALGO's trade dispute with the council. Thus, 
in the attempts to build a popular social movement to defend public 
housing the public service workers remained on the margins. 
The Dundee Council's campaign of opposition lasted for the better 
part of a year. It began in October 1980 with the council finding a 
legal loophole which justified them in taking no action to implement 
the Tenants'Rights Bill, a loophole which was quickly blocked by 
special amending ·legislation rushed through Parliament. The refusal 
of NALGO to process applications for house purchases provided further 
grounds for prevarication and at much the same time efforts were made 
to enlist the support of other Labour controlled districts in Scotland 
in an attempt to broaden the struggle. NALGO's demand for additional 
staff allowed the council to call for a report on staffing and by 
these means decisions about the implementation of government policy 
were deferred until the beginning of 1981. An exasperated Secretary 
of State demanded evidence of the council's preliminary provisions 
for house sales and receiving none he called for a public enquiry in 
February. At the opening of this some 300 pickets forced their way 
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into the room and only after a noisy scene in which they were ejected, 
could the proceedings get under way. Not surprisingly its findings en-
abled Mr Younger to declare that the councillors would be in default 
of their statutory duties if they resisted further and it was made 
clear that penalties would fall on individual members of the Labour 
Group. This was, of course, a defeat yet the opportunity to challenge 
the government's housing policy in a very visible and public way was 
regarded by those who had led the campaign as more than a small crumb 
of comfort. It enabled the Labour Group to impress on the citizens of 
the city the effects of what it saw as a foolish and harmful measure, 
and it provided for many individuals and associations an opportunity 
to declare their support for the campaign of resistance. In the late 
summer of 1981 another legal loophole was found by the resisters but 
this too was blocked by special legislation. After a ruling against 
the council by the Land Tribunal, the fight was abandoned. 
At almost the same time the Lothian efforts at defiance also 
ceased. Following lengthy and acrimonious debates inside the Labour 
Party and Labour Group it was agreed to cut £30 millions from the re-
gional budget and although there was subsequently a good deal of 
bickering over the precise ways the savings could be accounted, the 
Labour councillors capitulated. Given the new legislation and the ex-
traordinary powers now assumed by the Secretary of State they had 
little choice. Subsequently, in the regional elections in May 182 the 
Labour Group lost its small majority. In a 'hung' council the Conser-
vatives took office, depending on some support from the Liberals and 
S.D.P. The loss of power was obviously regretted by the Labour Party 
but it could take some comfort from the fact that there clearly re-
mained substantial popular support for its stand. 
In both Lothian and Dundee, the mobilisation of local activists, 
and of past legacies was essentially against the policies of central 
government. And it was the action and reaction of central government 
which escalated local resistance. Scottish Office ministers took 
pains to label both authorities 'militant', and their spending plans 
'excessive and unreasonable', contrasting them with 'moderate' auth-
orities. The local struggles of Lothian and Dundee quickly became 
part of the national struggle between right and left. It was this 
1 nationalisation' of the local issues which helps explain why Lothian 
and Dundee became 'causes c~l~bres'. 
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Conclusion 
For all the efforts of Lothian and Dundee, serious opposition to 
the economic and social policies of the 'new right' government has 
been, to date, rare. Nevertheless, the arbitrary demands for budget 
cuts and the programmes for housing were widely disliked in Scotland. 
There were very few local authorities that looked on these manifes-
tations of monetarist policy with favour; not even the Tory councils 
applauded. Sober and constrained people, the chief administrators, 
were heard to declare their incredulity and dismay first at the app-
arently cavalier way in which budget reductions were demanded (with 
no serious attempts to evaluate the needs or wishes of local people 
or the disparate requirements of Scotland's highly diversified areas), 
then at the massive erosion of local autonomy implied by the coercive 
legislation( 22 l. 
Only a very small number of authorities put up any resistance. 
What made it possible for them to do so? The question, we would sub-
mit, is an important one for those who believe that current policies 
will erode those modest gains made by the organised working class in 
Britain, and will deepen the divisions and the gross inequalities in 
our society. The attack on the public provisions of housing, welfare, 
education and health that have been launched by the new right threat-
en the living conditions of the poorer sectors of the population and 
are quite as important as the policies which have had such profound 
impact on employment. And those attacks focus directly upon local 
government and other local administrative structures. 
We have looked in a preliminary way at resistance as it develop-
ed in two very different localities yet despite the wide variations 
in their industrial and occupational make up, some common features of 
their capacity for defiance~ observable. 
First, we should note the changes that had taken place inside 
their local Labour Parties and Labour Groups. There were changes both 
in personnel and in ideology. In both Dundee and Lothian new cohorts 
of younger, more radical councillors and activists had appeared. In 
Dundee a reputedly corrupt Labour Party had been substantially reform-
ed(23) - in part through the efforts of the unionists who played such 
an important role in the No-Sales campaign. In Lothian the change in 
the party and group was more gradual but as we have argued, the re-
organisation of local government had attracted a new generation 
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of activists. As with their counterparts in Dundee, they were striv-
ing for a more open, participatory style of politics, one which deli-
berately sought to engage a number of extra-party associations. More-
over, councillors in each group saw in local government the opportun-
ity to implement more genuinely socialist policies. From the closer 
interaction of elected representatives and the leaders of local press-
ure groups they hoped to broaden public awareness of the value of lo-
cal services and the real threat that monetarist policies posed to 
these. No doubt their crusading zeal was sharpened by the fact that 
in each case control of their council was by no means secure. The ex-
tent of popular mobilisation behind their campaigns of resistance was 
some vindication of their belief that local politics could be made 
more vigorous, that when they were encouraged to do so local people 
would try to defend those items of 'collective consumption' on which 
they depended. 
Secondly, we can see from these 'pilot' researches that the move-
ments of resistance required the successful connection of current 
struggles with previous ones, and with the legacies of ideas and or-
ganisations they have left behind. The Dundee case, in particular, 
illustrates this. The survival of the liaison committee and the F.T.O. 
and their relations to the reformed Labour party were vital to the 
mounting of the campaign. Friedland et al. have encouraged us to see 
municipal agencies and activities as 'a repository of historical de-
mands•{24), and we could usefully extend their usage of this phrase 
to include the residues of symbols, ideas and associations that have 
been forged in successive struggles in all local polities. And we 
should not confine ourselves to thinking only about the legacies of 
the left, for right wing groups and right wing campaigns have left 
their mark too. In contemporary struggles both sides draw upon their 
respective histories, as we could see in Lothian where the long-
established ratepayers groups entered the fray. During the confronta-
tions with George Younger these old legacies, on both sides, were 
called upon; old campaigners re-emerged and moribund networks of in-
fluence had life breathed into them. The point is simple. The shap-
ing of dissent, more broadly of political discourse, is historically 
conditioned. In localities where the chief protagonists were sensitive 
to this they had more chance of producing popular mobilisations. 
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The efforts of Margaret Thatcher's government to 1privatise 1 
many publicly owned resources and substantially to reduce local gov-
ernment expenditure have met with some resistance. Popular movements 
of opposition have appeared in a small number of local authorities. 
Of course, they have been defeated, but from that we need not draw 
entirely gloomy conclusions. The government at Westminster has 'won' 
only by taking upon itself unprecedented powers to control local auth-
orities, powers which are widely resented (and not only on the left 
but by a good many Tories who have long believed that local auton-
omy was precious). Moreover, in those cases where resistance did de-
velop, there was demonstrated a potential for political engagement 
which skilful political leadership might well build upon. British po-
litics are changing. Political action, process and discourse are 
gradually breaking out of their institutional strait-jackets. The 
major parties have been changing, new parties have been emerging and 
levels of political competence increasing. At all levels there is 
evidence of a quest for new, less formalised .modes of political ex-
pression. A socialist party that was prepared to learn from,and work 
with,the elements of this more fragmented structure, which was willing 
to listen rather than incorporate and dominate might have some chance 
of challenging the rule of the new right. We are a long way from that, 
but a first task for those who wish to see in Britain the establish-
ment of some form of democratic socialism might well be to look in 
more detail at the stirrings of resistance that have developed in 
those arenas to which ordinary people have most access: at resis-
tance in local politics. 
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